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Employment Division v. S m i t h and
the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism
Ira C. LUPU*
When the organizers of this Symposium asked me to
discuss the future of the free exercise of religion, I thought I
might address several subjects: Employment Division v.
Smith,' and its treatment by the lower courts and legal
scholars; important new developments in state constitutional
law affecting religious liberty; the Church of the Lukumi2 case,
then pending before the U.S. Supreme Court; and the status of
the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).3
Once my turn to address the Symposium actually arose,
however, a number of speakers had addressed Smith and its
consequences, Professor Carmella had thoroughly assessed the
state law developments,4 and Professor Laycock-who argued
the Church of the Lukumi case in the Supreme Court and has
participated extensively in the legislative effort to enact
RFFU-gobbled up much of what was left over.
Left with the crumbs, I faced a n academic's mini-crisis: I
could either remain mute or run the risk of boring the

* Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, National Law Center, The
George Washington University. This paper is based (somewhat loosely) upon
remarks made at a Symposium on New Directions in Religious Liberty, held a t
Brigham Young University on January 22-23, 1993. My thanks to Professors Fred
Gedicks and Cole Durham, and to the Brigham Young University Law Review, for
the invitation to participate in the Symposium and the splendid arrangements they
made for it.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
3.
S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). The House passed H.R. 1308 on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG.REC. H2356-63
(daily ed. May 11, 1993), and S. 578 was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 15 to 1, 139 CONG.REC. D472 (daily ed. May
6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y.
TIMES,
May 10, 1993, at A9.
4.
Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y .U. L. REV. 275.
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(Saturday a.m.) audience by repeating much of what had been
thoroughly dmussed over the previous two days. Believing that
originality and creativity may sometimes result from precisely
this sort of s q ~ e e z e I, ~nevertheless ventured onward in my
remarks. What follows is reasonably true to the address I
delivered, which was in lieu of the thoughts that centrally
occupied my mind that day-to wit, the beauty of Utah and the
special qualities of its Mormon6 community.
AND FUTUREOF Smith
I. THE CONSEQUENCES

Like many others, I believe that Employment Division v.
Smith is substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible.
For example, Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, claims to be
a n originalist.' Smith shows no signs, however, of any such
orientation; the Court's opinion totally ignores both the text
and history of the Free Exercise Clause. In addition, Smith
offends institutional and process norms as well. Relying on
overruled or doctrinally discredited decisions of the Supreme
Court, as did the Smith majority: is ordinarily frowned upon
i n legal circles, as is the practice of deciding major
constitutional questions without giving the parties an
opportunity to brief and argue them. Understandably, then,
criticism of Smith on those grounds has become cornmonpla~e.~

5. At least it works that way in science, in which, unlike the law, professional
norms operate strongly against doing no more than repeating what is already
known.
6. "Mormon" is a term used to refer to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints.
7. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
8. The Smith opinion cites approvingly Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940), without mentioning that it was overruled three years later by
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943). 494 U.S. a t
872. A lawyer who did this in a brief to any court could expect to be publicly
chastised for it. The Smith opinion also cites with approval the belief-action
distinction originally created in free exercise law by Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1978), without fairly describing the extent to which the Reynolds
approach had been discredited and rejected in the twentieth century. 494 U.S. a t
872.

9. For criticism of Smith, see James D. Gordon 111, Free Exercise on the
Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Harry F. Tepker, Jr.,
Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1
(1991). Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi echoed many
of these scholars' criticisms. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
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What is less obvious and
however, is why Smith matters.
argued, free exercise law on the
quite hostile to religious liberty,''
reaction?
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perhaps more intriguing,
If, as has been repeatedly
decision's eve was already
what explains the powerful

A. Cognition and Coase
Smith's sweeping terms plowed through the cognitive dissonance that had become pervasive among followers of free
exercise trends. Before Smith, a long line of Supreme Court
decisions rejecting free exercise claims could each be satisfactorily explained to most Americans by simply referencing the appropriate buzz words-an Indians case," a military case," a
Muslims-in-prison case,13 a tax-system-integrity case,'* and
several cases concerning churches that many suspected had a
fraudulent air about them.15 The average American could
learn of all these cases and still believe that the Free Exercise
Clause would protect him or her, even if it did not protect others? This sort of thinking is always good for tyranny and bad

Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defending Smith's outcome, but not the
opinion itself); see also Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing
that constitutional history does not support the concept of exemptions); William P.
Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to
Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICS& PUB. POLV 591 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH.L.
REV. 743, 756-57 (1992).
11. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 US. 439 (1988);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
12. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
13. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
14. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
15. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990);
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
16. Cf, NAT HENTOFF,FREE SPEECHFOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992). Indeed, Smith itself had some of this character-did we really expect that the Supreme Court was going to legitimate the use of hallucinogenic drugs under the
Constitution? Justice O'Connor did not disappoint us in this regard. Just as she
indicated that the state should not endorse religion but blinded herself to such
,
U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., conendorsement in Lynch v. D o ~ e l l y 465
curring), she purports to believe in a robust religious liberty but nevertheless is
prepared to deny it to those who practice the rituals of the Native American
Church. Smith, 494 US. at 902-03, 906 (O'Co~or,J., concurring). As former Attor-
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for liberty. By ending the stream of decisions designed to appear as special exceptions-that is, by emphasizing a new general principle rather than focusing on the facts of the
case-smith raised consciousness of what had been occurring
in the field.
Second, while the Reagan and Bush Administrations had
been pushing a philosophy of judicial restraint for the previous
decade, they may have been internally divided as to where that
philosophy would take them with regard to free exercise. It
may have been easy for some conservatives to think that the
Bill of Rights is divisible; that is, that the Court in the 1980s
would cut back on perceived excesses of its predecessors on
questions of privacy, criminal procedure, freedom of expression,
or nonestablishment, but that it would not similarly undermine
prevailing law on the Free Exercise Clause. That hope, of
course, was sheer fantasy; statism tends to swallow the entire
Bill of Rights, rather than the particular provisions those in political power do not favor.
Third, if one focuses on the dynamics of litigation and
settlement, the argument that Smith only clarified, rather than
altered, the law is vastly overstated. Prior to Smith, prospective and actual litigants on both sides of free exercise questions
had to consider the distinct possibility that a free exercise
claim would successfully exempt a particular group or practice
from a n otherwise generally applicable law. Indeed, although
the Supreme Court grew increasingly inhospitable to free exercise claims over time, such attacks occasionally prevailed in the
lower courts, state1? and federal.'' Appraising the probability
of success in light of these emerging developments presumably
affected both a litigator's decision whether or not to bring suit
i n a particular circumstance, and his or her decision as to the
terms and appropriateness of compro~nise.'~Pre-Smith free
exercise law inevitably cast a sigdicant shadow over the bargains struck by parties to religious liberty disputes.
Smith has altered that shadow. The lower courts have

ney General John Mitchell once aptly put it, 'Watch what we do, not what we
say." See David Broder, FBI Building Named for Hoover Can Be a Reminder, Not
a Tribute, CHI. TRIB.,Mar. 11, 1993, at 23.
17. See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1981).
19.
These estimates may also have affected legislative bargaining over whether
to create a religious exemption, although that is less likely.

-
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ignored the Supreme Court's emphasis upon criminal laws of
general applicability, and they have been quite willing to extend the reasoning of Smith to the fullest extent po~sible.'~
We all understand that Smith transfers power away from religion and toward the state; the angry reaction at the Symposium to Mark Tushnet's suggestion that state-church conflicts
may help religious communities "clarifly] [their] commitm e n t ~ "was
~ ~ simply a local manifestation of that awareness.
As the Mormon experience amply demonstrates? clarification
of this sort tends to be little more than a process of change
coerced by state oppression or insensitivity.
Of course, those versed in law and economics might say I'm
making too much of the argument that pre-Smith law influenced free exercise litigation strategies and settlements, partly
because the free exercise entitlement was relatively weak before Smith, and partly because their general view is that the
initial assignment of entitlements frequently does not matter.
In the hypothetical world described by the Coase T h e ~ r e m ? ~
in which zero transaction costs are assumed, the parties are expected to bargain to an efficient result, regardless of the law's
allocation of rights.
With regard to disputes over religion, however, this assumption is highly implausible. However irrational the challenged religious commitments may seem, communities of believers are deeply invested in them. The idea that such commitments can be bargained away without incuning substantial
transaction costs, measured by the religious community's willingness to allocate resources in resistance to the state's encroachments upon its religious belief and practice, is absurd.
When people believe that God has commanded some practice,
and institutions have crystallized around that belief, fidelity to

For decisions reading Smith broadly and extending it to civil matters, see
20.
Ryan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992); American Friends Sew. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961
F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927
(6th Cir. 1991); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 786 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D. Ohio
1992); In re Chinske, 785 F. Supp. 130 (D. Mont. 1991); New Life Gospel Church
v. Department of Community Affairs, 608 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992).
Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV.
21.
117, 132.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Re22.
sponse to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAULL. REV. 167 (1992).
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.1 (1960).
23.

264

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

it cannot be negotiated away without costly convulsions.24
Under these conditions, it will be very difficult for disputing parties t o find common ground for compromise. One would
therefore expect the substantive content of the law, rather than
the parties' mutual understanding of their respective interests,
to be the primary variable in the way disputes are settled. I
suspect that the change in free exercise law that Smith represents will have a dramatic affect on the range of suits brought
and settlements reached, as well as on the results of actual
litigation, all to the detriment of religious liberty.

B. The Importance of Church of the Lukumi
in the Future of Free Exercise:
Moderating the Effectsof Smith
Perhaps the pessimism of this analysis can be escaped by
focusing upon what Smith leaves open, rather than upon the
damage it may already have done. At the Symposium, Professor Laycock contended that the Church of the Lukumi casez5
presented little opportunity for substantive gains for free exer~ i s e . 'At
~ best, he said, a disaster for religious liberty might be
avoided if the Justices accept his argument that the City of
Hialeah engaged in an unconstitutional religious gerrymander
when it enacted various ordinances prohibiting certain forms of
ritual ~laughter.~'
With all respect to Professor Laycock's modesty in refusing

24. Asymmetry of information between state and church officials is likely to
further undermine any prediction that the parties will be indifferent to the choice
of liability rule. As economists have argued, the presence of private information
will skew the outcome of bargains. See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson & Mark A.
Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON.THEORY
265
(1983). This has been measured in the context of the settlement of litigation, although the variables of interest to parties must be specified and quantified for the
measurements to be reliable in economic terms. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation
and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON.404 (1984). Information asymmetry is of course endemic to church-state conflicts involving religious
beliefs. Although the religious community may understand the state's policy concerns, state authorities are likely to be woefully ignorant and uneducable concerning the history and theological significance of a religious community's commitments.
The recent tragedy at Waco, Texas involving the Branch Davidians' standoff with
the FBI .seems a good example of this sort of unbridgeable misunderstanding.
25. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
26. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 221, 255.
27. Id.
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to proclaim the possibility of an important victory, I believe
Church of the Lukumi proved t o be much more significant than
he suggested. First and foremost, the Court unanimously
agreed that this was a religious gerrymander, and that such
By holding that the
acts are presumptively ~nconstitutional.~~
Constitution prohibits religious gerrymanders structured to the
detriment of a particular faith, the Court has reaffirmed
Larson v. Valente2' and constructed an outer boundary beyond
which the deterioration of free exercise protection will not pass.
Although the Court's opinion is entirely true to the equal protection character of Smith, the right of religious minorities to
be free from state discrimination, both overt and covert, is of
both theoretical and practical significance. Furthermore, any
constitutional victory for an unusual, numerically small religion constitutes a significant sign that the Free Exercise
Clause still carries some punch.
Second, Church of the Lukumi provides important information about the views of Justices Souter and Thomas, each of
whom replaced a dissenting Justice in Smith. The Court opinion in Church of the Lukumi expressly reaffirmed Smith's underlying principle of formal free exercise neutrality.30Justice
Thomas joined in this portion of the opinion, thus indicating
his agreement with the basic principle in Smith. By sharp
contrast, Justice Souter (fast becoming the darling of the law
professors) wrote a concurring opinion arguing that Smith may
have been wrongly decided and should be reexa~nined.~'
Thus,
Church of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-31.
28.
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding that the state may not legislate reporting
29.
requirements for religious fund raising that are designed to regulate "street religion" like the Unification Church while exempting mainstream religion). For an
Establishment Clause variation on the anti-gerrymander theme, see Grumet v.
Board of Education, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (school district gerrymander designed to benefit religious community that will not send its children out
of the community for special educational services violates the Establishment
Clause).
"In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our
30.
cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the
law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Church of
the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226. The Court spoke dishonestly, I believe, when it
claimed that its "cases" establish this general proposition; only Smith, which is the
only decision the Court cited, stands for this'proposition, and Smith is in tension
with all the other free exercise decisions of the past thirty years. Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Church of the Lukumi made this point forcefully. 113 S. Ct.
at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
31.
Id.
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the two against Smith (Justices Brerman and Marshall) have
become Thomas for and Souter against, and the latter brings
obvious fervor to the enterprise. The Smith lineup also reveals
that the Court is now divided 6-3 in favor of retaining Smith,
with one of the six (Justice White) about to be replaced by a
nominee whose views on free exercise may be more sympathetic than those of her predece~sor?~
Third, Church of the Lukumi reveals Justice Kennedy
f m l y committed to his vote in Smith. Among the Smith majority, he alone had shown a n inclination to depart from tendencies reflected in his earlier Religion Clause opinions.33 Because the Hialeah ordinances were so obviously gerrymandered
against the practitioners of Santeria, however, Justice Kennedy
might have ruled for the Church while remaining silent on his
more general views of free exercise exemptions from facially
neutral, generally applicable laws. That he did not do so suggests he was determined to reassure his conservative colleagues that he would not abandon them here as he had on
abortion and graduation prayer?
C. The "Hybrid Rights" Claim: Smith's Open Door
Nothing in Church of the Lukumi expands, narrows, or
clarifies Smith's pronouncement concerning so-called hybrid
right claims. These claims are based upon the conjunction of
free exercise and other constitutionally significant rights, like
free speech or parental control over the rearing of children.
Whatever the theoretical explanation for greater receptivity to
"free exercise plus" than "free exercise pure," a great many free
exercise claims might be recast to take advantage of this construct. Although I doubt that Smith itself might be so
tran~formed:~free exercise claims frequently involve expres32.
See Goldman v. Weinberger, 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc of a panel
opinion rejecting the claim of an Orthodox Jew to be exempt from an Air Force
regulation outlawing the wearing of headgear while indoors), affd, 475 U.S. 503
(1986).
33.
Compare Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) with County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) ( K e ~ e d y J.,
, dissenting).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Lee v. Weisman,
34.
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
35.
The peyote experience is apparently an inward one, and therefore does not
involve the sort of communication that might qualify it as expression for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., CARLOSCASTANEDA,
THE TEACHINGSOF DON JUAN:
A
(1968). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith:
YAQUIWAYOF KNOWLEDGE
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sion, association, or parental concern for the religious upbringing of their children. The last of these, of course, is the most
important; it is the foundation of Wisconsin u. Yoder,36and because it depends upon the judge-made right of parental control
as a boost to the textual right of free exercise, i t is the most
controversial member of the hybrid rights set.37 In addition, a
great many free exercise claims involve the parent-child-state
triangle,s8 so Yoder's fate is of crucial signifkance to the development of the law in the field.
Creative lawyering might thus preserve the force of many
potential claims. At the very least, pressing hybrid claims
wherever plausible will presumably result in either an explanation and reaffirmation of "free exercise plus," or an ultimate
admission by the Court that the theory was no more than a n
unprincipled attempt to pretend that Yoder survived Smith.

D. The Changing Court and the Future of Smith
Of course, as Justice White's resignationsg brought home,
the Justices that decided Smith will not be around forever. We
have a new President from a political party associated with a t
least some degree of commitment to the Bill of Rights and
judicial enforcement of it. President Clinton is likely to have
the opportunity to name several Justices, and a Court so reconstituted may ultimately reverse the course charted by Smith.
When nominating future Justices, however, President Clinton
is unlikely to put a high priority on Religion Clause considerations in general, or Free Exercise Clause concerns in particular. The most a foe of Smith might hope for is a new Justice
who takes the Bill of Rights seriously and believes in some version of the Warren Court's commitment to strenuous enforcement of those rights.40
Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S.Constitution, 18 CONN.L. REV. 739, 77378 (1986) (contrasting the elements and contours of free exercise claims and those
of free speech claims). Whether the peyote ritual, or the animal sacrifice rituals of
Santeria, contain sufficient components of association to qualify either under the
hybrid right theory may present closer questions.
36.
406 US. 205 (1972).
37.
Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and
Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.73, 87.
38.
See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 US. 1066 (1988); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852
(Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
39.
Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step Down from High Court, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar 20, 1993, at 1.
40.
See supra note 32 for a fragment of evidence concerning Judge Ginsburg's
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If this were to happen, we would be reminded that the set
of constitutional rights we enjoy are ultimately indivisible. I t is
very mcult to sustain the position that the Free Exercise
Clause should be actively enforced by courts, but that the
Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and the criminal procedure
provisions in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments should
not. Nor can one legitimately advocate free exercise activism
while a t the same time arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantees of equality, procedural fairness, and
(as construed) privacy should not be similarly enfor~ed.~'
Ultimately, this is a roundabout way of asserting that the
Free Exercise Clause may be reinvigorated only if Justices with
constitutional philosophies akin to those of Thurgood Marshall
or William Brennan are appointed. Of course, not everyone who
is unhappy with Smith would be prepared to accept a Warren
Court civil libertarian-type in exchange for Smith's overruling.
When contemporary egalitarian concerns are added to this
stew-that is, the possibility that a Marshall-Brennan type will
be prepared to uphold restrictions upon religious freedom enacted in the name of nondi~crimination~~-Smithmight turn
out to be something many of its opponents will decide they can
live with after all.
11. THE MOVEAWAYFROM THE SUPREMECOURT
Whatever the future course of free exercise adjudication in
the Supreme Court, Smith has already resulted in a flood of
activity with the potential to alter the course of religious liberty in American law. The energies flowing in Smith's wake are
academic, judicial, and political. As is evidenced by this Symposium, legal scholars have turned substantial attention to the

views on free exercise.
41.
The story becomes still more complex when one recalls that the Establishment Clause can be a serious limit on the political branches' capacity to accommodate religion. Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 US. 1 (1989) with
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 US. 327 (1987). For scholarly
debate on the subject, compare Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 685 (1992) with
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U . P~IT.L. REV. 75
(1990) and Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
the Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV.555 (1991).
42.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 US. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of tax exemption to university with racially discriminatory policies); see also
Tushnet, supra note 2 1, at 127.
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problems and issues raised by Smith. As so well documented by
Professor Carmella in her
some state courts have
begun to develop state constitutional law in response to the gap
created by Smith. And, on the legislative front, the United
States Congress continues to consider the Religious Freedom
Restoration Actd4 and the very recently introduced amendI
ments to the American Indian Religious Freedom
want to comment briefly on each of these phenomena, because I
believe that in combination they may eventually lead to and
sustain a deep and powerful structure of religious liberty law
that is largely independent of the Supreme Court's view of the
First Amendment's religion clauses.

A. Academic Commentary
With respect to the academic commentary, my point is
simple. Criticizing Smith is no longer original or useful; we
have all become repetitive in our criticisms, and by now, our
audiences are either persuaded or turned off. What remains
before us is the hard work of reconstruction, made more difficult by the chaotic and unsatisfactory state of free exercise law
as it stood on the eve of Smith. In other words, it will not do to
complain about Smith without offering concrete and detailed
proposals for how free exercise principles should be shaped i n
the future. If such efforts are fruitful, the "new" era of free
exercise may turn out to be far more coherent and substantively adequate than anything that has come before.

B. State Law and Religious Liberty
State courts may play a vital role in providing a solid foundation for future protection of religious liberty. Prior to Smith,
state supreme courts-even those with a strong religious liberty clause in their respective state constitutions-were quite
reluctant to tie their views of the subject to state law. Rather,
Carmella, supm note 4, at 310.
43.
44.
Senators Kennedy and Hatch recently introduced the proposed legislation in
the 103rd Congress as S. 578, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. See
S. 578, supra note 3; see also H.R. 1308, supra note 3. The House passed H.R.
1308 on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG.REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and S.
578 was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of
15 to 1, 139 CONG.REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y.TIMES,May 10, 1993, at A9.
45.
S. 1021
Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act), 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 518, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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pursuant to their own versions of "the devil made me do it,"
they tended to integrate state law with federal law and explicitly follow the federal law wherever it led?
The consequences of this refusal to articulate independent
state constitutional law are serious. On the road to Smith,
federal law became increasingly less protective of religious
liberty. By ignoring the possibility of independent state law
protection for religion, state courts became both dependent on
the U.S. Supreme Court and vulnerable to the erosion of religious liberty that resulted from the backsliding force of federal
law. Because state courts failed to rely upon their state constitutions to fill the widening gap between federal law and an
adequate conception of religious freedom:'
state law initially
provided no insulation against Smith's blistering effect on free
exercise norms.
Fortunately, as Professor Carmella illustrates, state courts
have begun to rely upon state constitutions in an effort to resurrect some aspects of religious liberty.4s In addition to the
substantive advance this represents, such state court behavior
advances process values as well. It permits the development of
constitutional norms of religious freedom without the brooding
omnipresence of a single, authoritative national tribunal or the
lesser (but significant) presence of a single set of national rules
and standards. If and when Smith is overturned by the Supreme Court, federal law may have a number of well-developed
judicial models, tested in the crucible of real adjudicative systems, from which to borrow and learn.

C. The Proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Whether Congress will act to overturn Smith by enacting
some form of the Religion Freedom Restoration Act4' (RFRA)
46.
See, e.g., People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (Free Exercise Clause
protects Native American Church member against criminal prosecution for ritual
use of peyote); accord, State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on
State Constitutions-Away fiom a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGSCONST.L.Q. 1
(1981); Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9
U. BALT.L. REV. 379 (1980).
47. See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic
Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constztutiona2 Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959
(1985).
Carmella, supra note 4, a t 310.
48.
49.
See S. 578, supra note 3; H.R. 1308, supra note 3. The most prominent
prior version of the proposed Act was H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The
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remains a n open question as of this writing. For the past few
years, the legislation was bogged down in partisan bickering
over the abortion question-that is, whether a statutory protection of religious freedom might become a platform for abortion
~ ~ fear that
rights were Roe v. wadeso to be o v e r t ~ r n e d .The
RFRA might operate in this way always seemed to me to be
grossly exaggerated. Bill Clinton's election to the presidency,
~ ~Justice
when coupled with Planned Parenthood v. C a ~ e yand
White's retirement:3 may settle the Roe question for the foreseeable hture. Accordingly, as recent news reports suggest,54
the ghost of abortion may stop hovering over R F W s prospects.
I have elsewhere analyzed extensively the constitutionality
and likely construction of RFRA.~' Here, I wish to emphasize
three additional points.
First, the 1993 version of RFRA that has passed the House
differs in one si@icant respect from the version I discussed in
my earlier work. The 1993 version declares its purposes to
include the restoration of "the compelling interest test as set
forth in Federal court cases before . . . Smith."56The predecessor provision which appeared in prior incarnations of RFRA
recited a purpose of restoring the "compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Y ~ d e r . " ~Be'
cause the "federal court cases" leading up to Smith had so

bill (H.R. 1308) passed the House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG.REC. H2356-63
(daily ed. May 11, 1993), and it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee
on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 15 to 1, 139 CONG.RE. D472 (daily ed. May 6,
1993); Adam Clymer, Congress Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y.TIMES,
May 10, 1993, at A9.
50.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51.
See Abortion May Split Backers, USA TODAY,April 17, 1991, a t A2; Robert
P, Hey, Religious Freedom Legislation Could Snag on Abortion Controversy,
CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONPTOR,
July 1, 1991, at 8.
52.
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
53.
See supra note 39.
54.
See Catholic Group Will Back Act on Religious Freedom, L.A. TIMES,
Mar.
13, 1993, a t B4 (reporting a compromise, pursuant to which legislative history but
not the legislation would assert that the A d was abortion-neutral); see also the
recent statement by Senator Kennedy, introducing RFRA of 1993, and asserting
that the U.S. Catholic Conference now supported the Bill. 139 CONG.REC.S2823
(daily ed. March 11, 1993) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
55.
Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1, 52-66 (1993).
56.
H.R. 1308, supra note 3, $ 2(b)(1) (set out a t 139 CONG.RE. H2356 (daily
ed. May 11, 1993)).
57.
H.R. 2797, supra note 49, § 2(b)(l) (set forth in the Statutory Appendix to
Lupu, supra note 55, at 87).
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eviscerated Sherbert and ~ o d e r : ~this drafting change has the
potential to dilute quite significantly the force of the Act. The
change is most certainly in tension with the "finding," remaining in the 1993 version, that "the compelling interest test a s set
forth in Sherbert . . . and . . . Yoder is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
governmental interest^."^' At the very least, the revised purposes provision signals to the Supreme Court that the Congress
will be receptive to a continuation of a free exercise standard
that is nominally favorable but operationally hostile to religious freedom?' RFRA, so construed, would do little good other than generate political benefit for its sponsors.
Second, and contrary to Professor Laycock's assertions,6l
RFRA would not have equally protective consequences for all
religions. In particular, its terms would tend to exclude a n
important set of religious liberty claims-those made by members of Native American Indian tribes seeking to protect sacred
Indian sites from the potentially destructive effect of government land development. As currently drafted, RFFU protects
religions from government inflicted 'b~rden[s].''~~
In Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective ASS'TL,~~
however, the
Supreme Court held that government construction on public
lands cannot constitute a cognizable burden upon religion so as
to trigger the protection of the Free Exercise Clause-even
when that construction inflicts serious damage upon the Indian
sacred sites located on those l a n d d 4 Unless Congress chooses
a term other than "burden" to trigger the stringent protections
of RFRA, or otherwise clearly articulates its intent to overturn
L ~ n g RF'
, ~RA'
~ s enactment will not, alter the Lyng result and
58.
Lupu, supra note 55, at 53-54.
59.
H.R. 1308, supra note 3, 8 2(a)(5). The predecessor version of RFRA had an
identical provision. H.R. 2797, supra note 49, 8 2(a)(5) (set forth in Lupu, supra
note 55, at 87).
60.
See id. at 65-66 (suggesting that the Supreme Court may in any event seek
ways of construing RFRA which narrow the gap between Congress-made and
Court-made law).
61.
Laycock, supra note 26, at 235.
62.
S. 578, supra note 3, 5 3(a)-3(b); H.R. 1308, supra note 3, 5 3(a)-303).
63.
485 U.S.439 (1988).
64.
I criticize Lyng's theory of claim cognizability in Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV.
933 (1989).
65.
The proposed amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
42 U.S.C. 8 1996 (1988), would overturn the result in Smith by preempting all
state law which inhibits use of peyote in religious rituals by Native Americans,
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thus may leave an entire category of important religion-based
claims outside the protection of federal law.
Third, it would be unfortunate if enactment of RFRA operated to stifle the promising state constitutional law developments previously discussed.66 State courts should treat RFRA
a s a foundation upon which state constitutional law can build.
Indeed, if the Supreme Court cuts RFRA back in the course of
statutory interpretati~n,~'
a post-enactment return by state
courts to the practice of dovetailing state law with federal law
would have tragic consequences.

'1n Smith's wake, the responsibility for creatively elaborating norms of religious liberty rests substantially with law-shaping and law-making institutions other than the Supreme Court.
The law that may serve this purpose will, for the most part, be
the corpus juris outside of federal constitutional law.68
As has always been the case, however, the future of free
exercise may well rest more upon sociological than legal considerations. The law cannot create the atmosphere of religious
tolerance and mutual respect upon which religious liberty ultimately depends. Recall Judge Learned Hand's general view of
the extent to which judicial review can preserve liberty:
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no
court can save . . . a society where that spirit flourishes, no
court need save . . . [and] in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.69

Employment Division v. Smith cannot destroy religious
liberty i n a society that truly respects it; nor, by the same token, can an overruling of Smith save that liberty in a society
and would reverse the general approach taken in Lgng to the problem of reconciling government land use with Indian religion. See S. 1021, supra note 45, 8 606;
H.R.518, supra note 45, 5 606.
66.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67.
See Lupu, supra note 55.
68.
Similar prescriptions might fairly be made of other areas of rights law,
such as that concerning privacy or new frontiers of equality, in which the Supreme
Court has retreated or called an end to growth. See Lupu, supra note 55, at 37-52
(discussing the proposed Freedom of Choice Act as a response to Casey and other
decisions involving reproductive rights).
69.
Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization,
in THESPIRITOF LIBERTY
172, 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952).
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which does not. The future of free exercise rests with a citizenry committed to the enterprise. Given the dramatic differences
among religions, the all-too-frequent nexus between religion
and violence, the psychologically threatening character of any
religion not one's own,70 and the history of religious intolerit' requires a triumph of hope over expeance in our ~ o u n t r y , ~
rience to be confident that religious exercise will remain free in
the third century of our Bill of Rights. To the extent law matters on such questions, however, liberating our commitment to
religious freedom from the imperialistic grip of the Supreme
Court and federal constitutional law may be the course of action most likely to produce salutary results.

70. See William P. Marshall, ?"he Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 843
(1993).
71. See generally Edward M . GafTney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style,
42 DEPAULL. REV. 263 (1992).

